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This study examines the value of audit quality in the capital markets setting. We 
argue that higher quality auditors are associated with lower post-earnings announcement 
drift (PEAD). Results show that clients of brand name auditors exhibit lower PEAD 
than small auditors, but only weak auditor industry specialist effects are identified. 
PEAD also differs for clients of individual Big 6/5 auditors, with clients of the smaller 
Arthur Andersen and Deloittes exhibiting greater PEAD, consistent with the DeAngelo 
(1981) size hypothesis. Finally, PWC exhibits higher PEAD in 1998, suggesting market 
uncertainty about quality implications of audit market structural change. 
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[A-head] 1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we address the question of differential audit quality effects within 
the capital market setting. In particular, we provide evidence on the association between 
audit quality and post-earnings announcement drift [hereafter PEAD]. PEAD suggests 
that market participants, in general, underreact to information contained in earnings 
announcements. We take the view that higher audit quality results in decreased 
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information uncertainty associated with unexpected earnings announcements, and hence 
predict a negative association between audit quality and PEAD.  
We contribute to the audit quality literature in a number of important ways. 
First, relatively few studies address audit quality in the capital markets context (Teoh 
and Wong (1993), Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002), Gul, Lynn and Tsui (2002)). 
Further, these studies tend to be based on the pre-earnings announcement period and 
focus on the relationship between security returns and audit quality. This is one of the 
first studies with a focus on the post-earnings announcement period.  
Second, the prior empirical findings on differential auditor quality effects in the 
capital market literature are mixed. For example, Teoh and Wong (1993), find evidence 
of stronger earnings response co-efficients [hereafter ERCs] for firms audited by the 
Big 8 auditors. Studies examining tighter definitions of auditor quality based on 
industry specialist effects include Krishnan and Yang (1999) and Hackenbrack and 
Hogan (2002). Krishnan and Yang find support for added industry specialisation effects 
in the form of stronger ERCs, whilst Hackenbrack and Hogan using a switching sample 
do not. Our study provides an additional insight into the market effect of audit quality.  
Third, our study is the first in the literature to examine the association between 
the pattern of security returns and audit quality within Big 6/5 firms. We also extend 
prior audit quality studies by undertaking tests of the capital market implications of the 
Coopers and Lybrand and Price Waterhouse merger.1 Finally, the study contributes by 
providing out of sample evidence on PEAD from a country other than the United States 
[hereafter U.S.].  
Our results are based on 3,731 earnings announcements during the period of 
1994-1998, obtained from the SIRCA Core Research Database.2 This sample period 
enables tests of audit quality post the 1989 mergers producing the Big 6. It also covers 
the period over 1997 – 1998, which facilitates the tests of PWC merger effects. Our key 
findings are the following. First, we find a significant negative relation between large 
auditors and PEAD with respect to unexpected good news announcements. Second, we 
find significantly different PEAD for firms classified on the basis of individual large 
auditors. Third, we observe capital market reaction around the PWC merger. Last, only 
weak evidence of PEAD reduction is found for alternative specifications of audit quality 
such as industry specialists, or industry leaders. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section the background 
is presented and the hypotheses are developed. Section 3 describes the design, whilst the 




[A-head] 2. Background and hypothesis development 
 
Prior literature has documented a relation between auditor size and auditor 
quality. DeAngelo (1981) argues that larger auditors provide enhanced training 
resources for staff, commit to higher promotion expenditure and provide opportunities 
for peer review generating greater reputation capital. Other incentives for larger auditors 
to provide higher audit quality relate to the substantial personal wealth of partners 
invested in larger accounting firms, and the lower level of dependence of partner’s 
wealth on any given client. To protect this higher reputation capital, larger auditors have 
                                                 
1 PricewaterhouseCoopers is denoted by “PWC” throughout the paper. 
2 Security Industry Research Corporation Asia Pacific. 
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added incentives to identify and report accounting breaches. Thus, larger auditors 
provide relatively higher audit quality.  
Studies have also argued that higher audit quality proxied by auditor size, leads 
to a better information environment. For example Teoh and Wong (1993) argue that 
higher audit quality leads to closer concordance of reported earnings with GAAP. 
Hence these earnings are more informative about value. They provide evidence which 
suggests higher ERC’s for firms audited by larger auditors than those audited by smaller 
auditors. The credibility of the information argument proposed by Teoh and Wong 
(1993) is also consistent with the information signalling assertions made by Willenborg 
(1999) and Weber and Willenborg (2003).3 
More recently, Gul, Tsui and Lynn (2002) develop Teoh and Wong (2003) by 
showing that the relationship between improved earnings informativeness for higher 
quality auditors relates to the mitigation of agency costs where low insider ownership is 
present. Gul, Tsui and Lynn (2002) also show that the negative association between low 
management ownership and higher discretionary accruals is weakened in the presence 
of a higher quality auditor. These results suggest the importance of higher audit quality 
in constraining earnings management and boosting earnings informativeness in the 
presence of high agency costs.  
Other supporting evidence from the accruals literature indicates that higher 
quality auditors act to reduce bias in accounting information, and improve the 
information environment. For example, Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999) document 
a reduced magnitude of discretionary accruals for clients of Big 8 auditors compared to 
clients of non-Big 8 auditors.  
We extend the previously identified relation between audit quality and 
information environment by analysing the relation between PEAD and earnings 
announcements of firms with differential audit quality. Our framework is built on Chan 
(1988), who finds that contrarian investment strategies may not lead to significant 
abnormal returns due to temporary changes in the underlying risks of winners and 
losers.4 The implication of Chan (1988) is that information risk associated with earnings 
announcements leads to a temporary risk adjustment in the underlying stocks. Thus we 
assume that unexpected earnings news is associated with an initial increase in the 
uncertainty of investors’ perceived distribution of future cash flows. This information 
risk holds asymmetric implications for good and bad news announcements.  
For good news announcements the release of earnings information is likely to 
produce an under-reaction, since the positive news effect is partially offset by the 
increase in information risk. As the information environment stabilises, and the risk 
dissipates, the price increasingly reflects the information, producing PEAD.  
For bad news announcements the opposite occurs. Upon the release of bad news, 
the probability of overreaction for bad news stocks is higher due to the simultaneous 
release of bad news, coupled with increased risk in the firms’ information environment. 
Under this set of circumstances we would expect that rather than exhibit PEAD, the 
stock would drift higher due to the initial overreaction. Thus for a bad news portfolio, 
PEAD may not be present.  
Other studies point to an asymmetry in the relative magnitude of information 
risk for good and bad news stocks, consistent with these predictions. For example, the 
                                                 
3 Willenborg (1999) documents both an information signalling aspect along with the insurance benefit of 
high quality audits. 
4 Recently, behavioural explanations have been offered for PEAD such as Liang (2003). These studies 
explain PEAD in terms of investor bias associated with interpretation of quarterly earnings announcement 
information (Bernhard and Thomas (1989), (1990)). This study however utilises annual earnings 
announcements, as quarterly financial reporting is not mandatory in Australia. 
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management forecasts of earnings literature such as Hutton, Miller and Skinner (2003) 
find that bad news is always informative, whether it is supplemented by other 
management discussion or not. In contrast, Hutton, Miller and Skinner find that good 
news forecasts are only informative when accompanied by verifiable statements from 
management, suggesting that good news is less believable. Also consistent with these 
assertions is Jennings (1987), who finds that management earnings forecasts of bad 
news are more credible. The credibility of bad news vis-à-vis good news is also 
plausible as management compensation is based on good news, giving management 
incentives to surprise on the upside.* 
Finally, audit quality is likely to matter more in a good news context due to 
greater litigation risk attached to good news. Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998) found 
that certain types of fraud, principally revenue fraud is associated with higher likelihood 
of litigation against independent auditors.† The risk in good news is also demonstrated 
in the earnings restatement literature (Palmrose, Richardson and Schulz (2004)). 
The above discussion suggests that underreaction to good news has better 
theoretical support, than underreaction to bad news. Therefore, that is our focus. We 
argue consistent with Teoh and Wong (1993) that audit quality is related to earnings 
credibility. ‡  Consequently, unexpected earnings announcements of firms audited by 
high quality auditors lead to lower initial information uncertainty than earnings 
announcements of firms audited by lower quality auditors. Lower initial information 
uncertainty reduces the initial under reaction for good news announcements, hence we 
predict: 
 
H1: Firms audited by larger auditors have lower PEAD than  
firms audited by smaller auditors  
 
 Also addressed in this study is the question of whether earnings announcements 
of firms audited by industry specialist auditors also reduce the initial information 
uncertainty. The motivation here is to assess whether there are levels of audit quality 
above and beyond the traditional distinction between Big 8/6/5/4 and non-Big 8/6/5/4 
auditors. This test is interesting in light of conflicting findings in the literature regarding 
the value of industry specialists. For example, Krishnan and Yang (1999) find that firms 
with specialist auditors have higher ERCs than firms with non-specialists. On the other 
hand, Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002) find that whilst the market recognises the quality 
distinction between large and small auditors, they find no incremental effects for auditor 
specialists based on an audit switch sample. 
 Auditor industry specialists are defined as Big 6/5 auditors having a 20 % 
industry share of fees or clients in those industries classified as specialist industries in 
Ferguson and Stokes (2002). As with prior assertions regarding the ability of higher 
quality auditors to lower information uncertainty, we test the following hypothesis: 
  
H2:  Firms with industry specialist auditors have lower PEAD than 
                                                 
* We note that the conservatism argument proposed by Basu (1997) may hold implications for 
asymmetries in bad news (more timely – lower information risk) vis-à-vis good news (more persistent – 
higher information risk) to the extent that there is uncertainty regarding the timing of future good news 
recognition.  
† Litigation risk is an important variable that makes bad news important in the U.S. Lower litigation risk 
in Australia is likely to reduce the information content of bad news in Australia. (We are grateful to our 
reviewer for this suggestion).  
‡ Implicit in this suggestion is that information quality (environment) is driven by audit quality and that 
audit quality is not just a signalling mechanism chosen by firms for information quality 
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  firms with non-specialist auditors. 
 
Last, we tighten the definition of an industry specialist auditor still further, and examine 
auditor industry leaders who are defined as the auditor with the largest market share in 
each industry (Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2003)). Auditor industry leadership is 
arguably a more unequivocal measure of specialisation, since it does not rely on an 
arbitrary market share threshold such as the specialist test in H2, and is measured across 
all industries, not just ‘specialist’ industries. Thus H3 becomes:  
 
H3:  Firms with industry leader auditors have lower PEAD than 
  firms with non-leader auditors 
 
We derive all three hypotheses primarily on the basis of the U.S. capital market 
evidence. Clearly, there are significant differences in the institutional, regulatory and 
microstructure environments between the U.S. and Australia. These include the 
relatively small and thin capital market of Australia, the inability to short sell in 
Australia, the differential corporate regulation leading to different governance 
mechanisms, disclosure requirements and GAAPs.  
 
[A-head] 3. Design  
 
[B-head] 3.1 Sample 
 
Audit data is obtained from the Ferguson and Stokes (2002) database, whilst 
earnings announcement dates, stock price, trading volume and All Ordinaries Index data 
are obtained from SIRCA. Other control variables, such as investor sophistication 
metrics were obtained from the Aspect Financial Database, Huntleys Datanalysis, 
Reuters Beacon, the State Library microfiche collection or hardcopy annual reports. 
Where possible, data was directly obtained from the Ferguson and Stokes data files. The 
sample includes firms with complete pricing over the 90-day sample window obtained 
from SIRCA for the years 1994–1998 (both years inclusive). Table 1 reports the 
distribution of firms.  
 
Table 1 
PEAD sample indicating total firms available (column 1) and reduced sample of available equity 
prices (column 2) by year 
 
 1 2 
Year Initial Sample 
 Available 
Prices 
1994 1069 677 
1995 1055 905 
1996 1046 736 
1997 1098 695 
1998 1084 718 
Total 5352 3731 
 
 
Firms with overseas head offices but whose shares are traded on the ASX were 
removed as these firms are audited by international affiliates of auditors and not by the 
Australian office. After excluding these firms, and those with missing data, a total of 
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3731 firm years with pricing available over the event window from CAR1–CAR90 
were utilised for the study.  
 
[B-head] 3.2 Model 
 
Hypotheses H1–H3 are tested using a pooled cross sectional regression model. 
Prior PEAD literature has identified risk as a possible explanation of the PEAD 
phenomena (Ball, Kothari and Watts (1993)). We use a risk proxy (leverage) to control 
for the “traditional” definition of financial risk in this study.§  
The transaction cost hypothesis is also an explanation advanced in prior 
research. Bhushan (1994) classifies transaction costs as either direct or indirect, and 
finds some empirical evidence to support this as a potential explanation of PEAD. 
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) find evidence that direct costs such as commissions and 
percent bid-ask spreads are inversely related to share price. Accordingly, we adopt the 
same proxy for direct transactions costs. Consistent with Bhushan, indirect costs such as 
price pressure and time delay are proxied for by dollar trading volume. The rationale 
here is that stocks subject to non-synchronous trading are subject to greater price 
pressure to fill orders compared to more liquid stocks.  
Size is also included as a control variable as prior studies such as Bernard and 
Thomas (1989, 1990) identify an inverse relationship between firm size and PEAD. The 
observation of greater PEAD magnitude for smaller stocks is also consistent with the 
behavioural explanation proposed by Hong and Stein (1999), who suggest that smaller 
stocks are researched less, have lower press coverage and are less likely to have costly 
public relations efforts. Consequently, smaller stocks should exhibit greater drift, as 
diffusion of news is slower in this section of the market.  
The ownership level of the top twenty shareholders is chosen as the 
sophistication proxy. This variable is included in light of Bartov, Radhakrishnan and 
Krinsky (2000) [hereafter Bartov et al. (2000)], who find a lower PEAD in stocks traded 
by sophisticated investors. Consistent with Bartov et al., it is assumed that investor 
sophistication is related to investor size.  
However we note that sophistication may have a positive co-efficient if it is 
associated with institutional book building in stocks post announcement. We suggest 
institutional re-weighting may have the effect of increasing drift due to excess 
institutional accumulation or selling in a relatively small market such as Australia. This 
assertion is also relevant to the trading volume, and share price transaction cost proxies, 
and so for these variables, we do not specify the direction of the hypothesised sign.  
As with prior PEAD literature, unexpected earnings are controlled for in a 
manner similar to Bhushan (1994) and Bartov et al. (2000).** An interaction term is 
used that controls for the marginal effects of each control variable on the slope of the 













                                                 
§ We explored the possibility of using beta as our risk control, however, the Centre for Research in 
Finance at the AGSM requires 4 years of monthly data before a beta can be calculated, which would have 
resulted in excessive sample attrition.  
** Unexpected earnings are estimated using the naïve model. Altering the partitioning of the good and bad 
news portfolios based on deciles of unexpected earnings makes no difference to the results reported in 
Panel A of Table 2. That is, the good news portfolio depicts significant positive drift, whilst the bad news 
portfolio shows no consistent evidence of drift. 





CAR  = Daily cumulative abnormal return for firm i cumulated over the sub- 
   cumulation periods at the announcement date (CAR1), CAR2, CAR3, 
   CAR4 and CAR5.††  
SUE   = Unexpected earnings deflated by total assets, formed into deciles and  
   scaled to range between 0 and 1.  
SIZE  = Total Assets of firm i, formed into decile portfolios by year, and scaled  
   to range between 0 and 1.  
SOPHIST = The level of share ownership held by the top twenty shareholders, split  
   into deciles by year, and scaled to range between 0 and 1.  
LEVERAGE = Debt to assets ratio, classified into three equal groups.  
SHAREPR = Share price at announcement date, classified into two groups, split at     
   median share price.  
TURNOVER = Classification into deciles based on dollar trading volume: CAR1 –     




AUDITOR: denotes the different gradations of audit quality test variables denoted in 
tests of H1-H3 as follows. 
 
(i) LARGE: dichotomous variable, 1 for Big 6/5 firm, else 0 for non-Big 6/5 
auditor.  
(ii) SPECIALIST: dichotomous variable, 1 for Big 6/5 specialist firm, else 0 for 
non-Big 6/5 auditor, and Big 6/5 non specialist.  
(iii) LEADER: dichotomous variable, 1 for Big 6/5 industry leader, else 0 for 
Big 6/5 non industry leader.  
e: error term. [AQ: confirmed]   
 
 
[A-head] 4.0 Results 
 
[B-head] 4.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of 3731 firm years are reported in Table 2. 
Panel A provides a summary of mean cumulative abnormal returns over the event 
window. Panel A indicates that for the sub-sample of 2169 good news announcements, 
the CARs are positive and significantly different from zero in all cases over the sample 
period. In contrast, for the sub-sample of 1559 bad news announcements, the CARs are 
not significant with two exceptions (CAR10, and CAR50). These descriptive statistics 
are consistent with our prediction of increased information uncertainty associated with 
good news versus bad news announcements, and similar to descriptives reported in 
Kinney et al. (2002). Like this study, they report a larger percentage of good news 
surprises, positive returns for the good news surprises, and weaker negative returns for 
bad news surprises, which at some time intervals record positive mean return.  
                                                 
†† We use market adjusted returns consistent with Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin (2002) [hereafter 
Kinney et al. (2002)]. 
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In Panel B of Table 2, the experimental variable LARGE shows that large 
auditors accounted for just over 67% of firms. The data for SPECIALIST indicates that 
of the 1916 large firms able to engage a specialist as per the Ferguson and Stokes 
(2002) definition, 512 (27%) had contracted with an industry specialist auditor. Of the 
2509 firms audited by large auditors, 25% of these were audited by industry leading Big 
6/5 auditors (LEADER).  
The SIZE variable is measured by firm’s total assets in thousands of dollars. The 
smallest firm has assets of just over $49,000, whilst the largest firm has total assets of 
$252 billion, indicating the sample has full representation of large and small companies. 
Median firm SIZE is just over $45 million, with a mean of just under $1.3 billion 
Australian dollars. [AQ; please specify currency done]  
Examination of the sophistication proxy, SOPHIST reveals that the average 
ownership of the top 20 shareholders is 69.38% of ordinary issued capital. The 
minimum is 7.22% and the maximum is 99.99%.‡‡ The average debt to total assets ratio 
is 11% with and median of 4%. The mean share price is $1.94. In keeping with efforts 
to include as many companies in the initial sample as possible, SHAREPR has a range 
with a minimum of 1 cent, and has a maximum of $56.00. Finally, the value of trading 
volume over the 90 day trading window indicates that mean value is $52.39 billion, 




Descriptive statistics – median cumulative abnormal returns (Panel A) by earnings surprise, and 
independent control variables (Panel B) 
 
       
Panel A: Partition Based on raw difference in unexpected earnings (N=2169 Good 
News, N=1559 Bad News) 
Good News Portfolio  Bad News Portfolio 
Time AR t-Stat Sig. level  Time AR t-Stat Sig. level 
CAR1 .0064 7.470 p=.000  CAR1 .0001 0.104 p=.917 
CAR2 .0112 9.309 p=.000  CAR2 -.0022 -1.259 p=.208 
CAR3 .0140 9.685 p=.000  CAR3 -.0017 -0.825 p=.410 
CAR4 .0141 9.173 p=.000  CAR4 -.0026 -1.170 p=.242 
CAR5 .0140 8.300 p=.000  CAR5 -.0025 -1.067 p=.286 
CAR10 .0138 6.444 p=.000  CAR10 -.0075 -2.504 p=.012 
CAR20 .0164 5.958 p=.000  CAR20 .0009 0.226 p=.821 
CAR30 .0151 4.674 p=.000  CAR30 -.0003 -0.052 p=.958 
CAR40 .0150 4.225 p=.000  CAR40 .0035 0.644 p=.520 
CAR50 .0214 5.120 p=.000  CAR50 .0140 2.234 p=.026 
CAR60 .0151 3.299 p=.001  CAR60 .0038 0.558 p=.577 
CAR70 .0086 1.762 p=.078  CAR70 -.0050 -0.671 p=.502 
CAR80 .0092 1.710 p=.087  CAR80 -.0063 -0.838 p=.402 
CAR90 .0168 2.928 p=.003  CAR90 .0109 1.350 p=.177 
         
 
Panel B: Independent Variables      
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum First Quartile Median Third Quartile M  
SUE 3731 -0.02 1.75 -50.95 -0.03 0.01 0.04  
SIZE 3731 1293981 10530294 49.43 11897 45353 189704 25  
                                                 
‡‡ A firm which was the subject of a takeover. 
§§ As at June 30, 1998 the exchange rate was A$1 = U.S. $0.6135 (Source: Reserve Bank of Australia.) 
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SOPHIST 3731 69.38 18.04 7.22 57.66 71.87 83.20  
LEVERAGE 3731 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.19  
SHAREPR 3731 1.94 3.41 0.01 0.34 0.84 2.35  
TURNOVER 3731 52389526 273216606 0.00 339680 1781368 9982865 5  
LARGE 3731 67%       
SPECIALIST 1916 27%       
LEADER 2509 25%       
Note: CARs are % market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. SUE is based on the naïve model, SIZE is total asse    
LEVERAGE is debt to assets ratio, SHAREPR is denoted in dollars, TURNOVER is trading value in dollars over the ev   
LARGE, SPECIALIST and LEADER are % of sample firms.  
 
 
[B-head] 4.2 Test results 
 
Tests of H1-H3 are initially run over two time periods (CAR1, CAR5) 
restricting sample selection to the good news portfolio where significant PEAD exists. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that adjusted R2s are around .01, similar to the results of 
Bartov et al. (2000), who report adjusted R2s of between .01 and .02 in their Table 5.3. 
Each model is significant with F values significant at the p<.05 level (two tailed).  
 
Table 3 
PEAD regression models for tests of H1 – H3 in the good news portfolio 
 
  CAR (1) CAR (5) CAR (1) CAR (5) CAR (1) CAR (5) 












Control Variablesa,b,c Predicted 
Sign 
2169 2169 1118 1118 1488 1488 
Constant  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.46) (0.31) (1.63) (1.23) (0.40) (0.24) 
SUE + -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.71) (-0.91) (-2.10)b (-2.43)b (-1.05) (-1.68)c 
SUE * SIZE  - -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
  (-1.24) (0.48) (-0.24) (0.53) (-1.16) (.06) 
SUE * SOPHIST -/+ 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
  (2.76)a (2.49)b (1.92)c (2.05)b (1.67)c (2.11)b 
SUE * LEVERAGE + 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.60) (2.71)a (-0.57) (1.06) (0.06) (1.88)c 
SUE * SHAREPR -/+ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (2.19)b (1.40) (1.37) (.57) (1.93)c (1.28) 
SUE * TURNOVER -/+ 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
  (1.88)b (1.87)c (1.54) (1.61) (2.34)b (2.03)b 
Experimental Variable       
SUE * LARGE - -0.01 -0.01     
  (-1.51)c (-2.36)a     
SUE * SPECIALIST -   -0.01 0.01   
    (-.86) (0.00)   
SUE * LEADER -     -0.01 -0.01 
      (-.48) (-1.14) 
Adjusted R2  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
F value  (3.33)a (5.20)a (2.08)b (2.95)a (2.17)b (3.82)a 
‘a’ Significant at the 1% level       
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‘b’ Significant at the 5% level       
‘c’ Significant at the 10% level       
a Notes: SUE is the size deflated unexpected earnings by year (naïve model), formed into decile portfolios 
and scaled to range between 0 and 1. SIZE is the total assets of the firm at the current year-end, formed 
into deciles by year and scaled to range between 0 and 1. SOPHIST is the percentage of shares owned by 
the top 20 shareholders. Decile portfolios are formed on a yearly basis, and scaled to range between 0 and 
1. LEVERAGE is the Debt to Assets ratio. This variable is classified into three groups, 0 with leverage to 
1%, 1 with leverage between 1% and 15%, and 2 with leverage 15% and above. SHAREPR is a binary 
variable, with above median share prices coded 1, and below median share prices (84 cents) coded 0. 
TURNOVER is the trading volume multiplied by share price and cumulated from CAR1 – CAR90 
formed into deciles. LARGE is the audit quality metric and is simply a binary variable, 0 indicating firm 
audited by non-big 6/5. SPECIALIST is the auditor industry specialist binary indicator, where 0 indicates 
a non-specialist large auditor, and 1, a specialist using the CFT definition. LEADER is a binary indicator 
where 0 is a non-industry leader Big 6/5 auditor and 1 indicates a Big 6/5 industry leader.  
b To test for potential problems with multicollinearity in the models, Bartov et al. (2000) conduct test of 
collinearity diagnostics. They identify VIF’s of less than 4. Statistical tests indicate that substantially all 
of the VIF’s are less than 4 also, indicating no potential problems with multicollinearity in the models. 
Additional observation of residual scatterplots and probability plots confirm this interpretation. 
c All control variables significance levels are reported on a two-tailed basis, whilst the experimental 
variables are reported on a one-tailed basis given the directional hypotheses. 
 
In terms of control variables, the interaction co-efficient for SIZE is not 
significant in Models 1 - 6. One notable result amongst the control variables is investor 
sophistication. Contrary to Bartov et al. (2000), the sign of the sophistication co-
efficient SOPHIST is positive and significant in each of the models tested. This is 
consistent with the proposed book-building explanation, that institutional traders have 
difficulty acquiring large quantities of stock in a relatively small market such as the 
Australian market. Support for this interpretation is strengthened by the positive co-
efficient and significance of TURNOVER and SHAREPR.*** The risk interaction proxy 
LEVERAGE, is positively related to PEAD, as expected, and significant in Models 2 
and 6 at p<.05 (one-tailed). 
The first experimental variable LARGE tests the hypothesis (H1) that clients of 
Big 6/5 auditors have lower PEAD. The evidence in Models 1 (CAR1) and 2 (CAR5) 
supports this hypothesis, with the test variable negative and significant at p<.10, and 
p<.01, respectively. This finding provides perhaps the first evidence in the literature that 
clients of large auditors exhibit lower PEAD than clients of small auditors.  
The test of H2 is the test of the incremental audit quality effect of industry 
specialisation. To examine whether the industry specialist is also valued, the auditor 
indicator variable is coded 1 for Big 6/5 industry specialist and 0 for non-specialist Big 
6/5 auditors. The results of the OLS regression models are for a reduced sample of 1118 
firms, and are shown in Models 3 and 4. Over each time horizon (CAR1, CAR5), the 
SPECIALIST indicator is not significant. The result implies that the market places no 
incremental value on the work done by industry specialists vis-à-vis the other large 
auditors.  
Finally, results for the test of H3 are depicted in Models 5 and 6. The LEADER 
indicator variable has a negative sign, as predicted, but is not significant. In summary, 
Table 3 indicates large auditors are associated with lower PEAD, after controlling for 
other potential PEAD determinants. However, tests based on the sub-sample of Big 5 
firms with auditor industry specialists and industry leaders indicate no significant 
effects on drift magnitude. In the next section, further sample partitions and sensitivity 
tests are undertaken.  
                                                 
*** We note the sign of the control variable for SUE is negative. However, this could be a function of the 
reluctance of institutions to book build in stocks with high variance earnings.  






[B-head] 4.3 Control for self-selection bias, and additional sensitivity tests  
 
To control for self-selection bias, we applied an auditor choice model on the full sample 
of 3731 firms. Control variables included a selection of those utilised in Clarkson and 
Simunic (1994). The auditor choice model is specified as follows:  
 
eitititititi MININGbLOSSbLEVERAGEbSIZEbbAUDITOR +++++= ,4,3,2,10,  
 
Where,  
AUDITOR = (0,1) variable measuring auditor quality (1=Big 6/5 firm) 
SIZE  = Log of firm size (total assets) 
LEVERAGE  = Ratio of total debt to total assets 
MINING = (0,1) variable with the value 1 if the firm operated in ASX industry     
     classifications 1-4. 
e  = error term.  
 
The model results are depicted in Table 4 below: 
 
Table 4 
Logistic regression of auditor choice 
   
Variable Wald Statistic 
Significance (two-
tailed) 
   
Intercept 177.41 p=.00 
Size 10.401 p=.00 
Mining 0.54 p=.00 
Loss 2.35 p=.46 
Leverage 177.414 p=.12 
Nagelkerke R2 = .139   
 
Table 4 indicates that the model obtains a Nagelkerke R squared of .14, 
successfully classifying 68.1% of observations. Model predictions were obtained, with 
the sample providing a total of 231 incorrect good news predictions, comprising 132 
non Big 6/5 firms, and 99 Big 6/5 firms. Rerunning the primary regression model over 
the test period on this sub-sample indicates that where the model is significant, the 
auditor quality interaction term is negative on all three occasions, and significant at 
p<.05 (two-tailed) on two of three occasions.††† Thus we conclude that whilst the above 
choice model is limited in terms of explanatory power, and its components do not match 
precisely those adopted in primary tests in Table 3, the bulk of this evidence suggests 
that results are not driven by self-selection effects.‡‡‡  
                                                 
††† The primary regression model is significant on CAR3, CAR4, and CAR5. At CAR4 and CAR5 the 
auditor interaction term is negative and significant at p<.05 (two-tailed). At CAR3, the interaction term is 
negative but only marginal in terms of significance.  
‡‡‡ We undertook sensitivity controls for information quality. We rerun all six regression models in Table 
3, including a proxy for information quality (total accruals) as an additional interaction term, consistent 
with Lang and McNichols (1990). When total accruals as a proxy for information quality is included in 
the model, results are unchanged by the inclusion of this potential correlated omitted variable.  
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In an additional sensitivity test, models 1–6 are replicated in the intervening time 
period between the announcement date (CAR1), and CAR5. In all cases the results are 
similar, with the following exception. At CAR2 and CAR3, the LEADER indicator is 
negative and significant at p<.05, and p<.10 (one tailed) respectively. At time intervals 
CAR2, CAR3, and CAR4, LARGE is negative and significant also at p<.10, p<.05 and 
p<.05 respectively.  
In terms of partitions on auditee size, we split the sample on size deciles. 
Analysis for good news stocks in the upper half of auditee size indicates that the audit 
quality indicator LARGE is no longer significant. However, LARGE is negative and 
significant at p<.05 for smaller sized deciles. This indicates that the value of audit 
quality, is more pronounced for smaller sized stocks, a finding consistent with the 
assertions of Willenborg (1999). Willenborg (1999) suggests that the information and 
insurance signalling attributes of auditing will matter most where information 
asymmetries abound.§§§  
 
[B-head] 4.4 Within Big 6/5 analysis 
 
In this section, the issue of whether auditor quality differs within the Big 6/5 is 
examined using the PEAD framework. We pose the following empirical question: is 
there a variation in the PEAD of companies grouped into portfolios on the basis of their 
Big 6/5 auditors? To examine this issue, the sample of good news stocks with large 
auditors is partitioned on clients of each individual audit firm, with a default 
comparison grouping of the other large auditors. Selected results are depicted in Figure 
1, which shows that clients of Arthur Andersen and Deloitte have visually greater 
PEAD vis-à-vis the other Big 5 auditors. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test produces 
significant differences in median drift to the default comparison group over the period 
CAR1–CAR90, at p<.00 for both these auditors. 
Importantly, we control for audit firm clientele effects, by comparing each audit 
firms client portfolios with other brand name auditors in terms of size and risk. The 
most notable differences are Deloitte and Pricewaterhouse – whose clients are 
significantly smaller, and KPMG whose clients are larger. However, we dismiss the 
possibility that the results depicted in Figure 1 are driven by size considerations for a 
number of reasons. First, the Arthur Andersen portfolio shows no size differences. 
Second, since the Deloitte portfolio is smaller, we might expect the Pricewaterhouse 
(prior to the merger) to behave in a similar fashion, which it doesn’t. Last, the size co-
efficient is not significant in the multivariate tests. In terms of risk, Ernst & Young 
clients show higher leverage, whilst Pricewaterhouse lower. Neither of these two 
auditors however shows differences in terms of PEAD.  
  
                                                 
§§§ Further analysis was run including main effects in models 1 and 2. Harmful multicollinearity appeared 
present in these models with VIF’s exceeding bounds suggested by Kennedy (2003). However, we note 
that the auditor interaction term co-efficients in the model including main effects were of similar 
magnitudes to those reported in the primary results. We also run a model of main effects for tests of H1 
(excluding interaction terms). This model reports similar results to those documented in Table 3.  
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Interestingly, the results partitioning on each individual audit firm are consistent 
with the DeAngelo (1981) assertions regarding the relationship between audit quality 
and auditor size. These results indicate the two smallest Big 6/5 auditors in terms of 
national market share in audit fees which display the greatest drift.**** This suggests that 
greater market uncertainty is associated with smaller auditor size, including partitions 
within the larger audit firm grouping.  
  
[B-head] 4.5 Audit firm merger effects 
 
 In further analysis, tests are conducted on the 1997 audit firm merger 
participants. This is done two ways with the results depicted in Figure 2. First, a 
comparison is undertaken between clients of PWC, and other Big 5 auditors in 1998, 
once again using the good news partition. This comparison indicates that PWC clients 
experienced greater drift than clients of the other Big 5 post the 1997 merger. Figure 2 
depicts greater differences between the newly merged PWC and the other Big 4 closer 
to the announcement date. This may indicate that structural consolidation in the supply 
of audit services increases uncertainty in the market around these events.   
 In a second test, we aim to simulate the client portfolio of PWC in the period 
pre-merger. To do this, the default comparison grouping is altered to the clients of 
Coopers and Lybrand, and Price Waterhouse in the sample years prior to the merger. 
This test examines whether any effects in the preceding analysis maybe related to the 
observation of higher PEAD for this portfolio in the past. The results depicted in Figure 
2 indicate when combined, the clients of Coopers and Lybrand and Price Waterhouse 
(CLPW) show low levels of drift pre-merger, and significantly lower than PWC clients 
in 1998 at p<.00. 
  
                                                 
**** Auditor size measured in terms of total audit fees in 1998. 
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[A-head] 5.0 Conclusion  
 
The objective of this study was to provide evidence on the relation between 
differential auditor quality and PEAD. We argue that audit quality reduces the initial 
information uncertainty associated with unexpected earnings announcements; hence 
PEAD should be lower for clients of higher quality auditors. Three distinct tests are 
undertaken. These include partitions based on auditor size, auditor industry 
specialisation, and auditor industry leadership.  
The sample was based on 3,731 firm years over 1994–98. We find a significant 
relation between auditor brand name and PEAD. Like Willenborg (1999), the audit 
quality effect appears to be confined to smaller firms, which is intuitively appealing due 
to the potentially greater importance of audit quality as a signal for smaller firms. 
However, evidence is weak on industry specialisation tests, which is consistent with 
Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002), who find no incremental ERC effects for industry 
specialists. In addition, tests of a tighter definition of auditor quality, industry leadership 
report only mixed results.  
Finally, examination of PEAD for each individual auditor is undertaken. 
Significant differences in the profiles of PEAD amongst the Big 6/5 are identified, with 
smaller auditors amongst the Big 6/5 showing higher levels of observed PEAD. This is 
consistent with the auditor quality/auditor size hypothesis in DeAngelo (1981). Further 
tests indicate that the newly merged audit firm, PWC, depicts greater drift than other 
large auditors. Combined, these results suggest that the capital market prices audit 
quality. 
 In summary, this study documents more recent Australian evidence on PEAD, 
and seeks to address the relative paucity of evidence on PEAD in the Australia context. 
Whilst it provides an interesting out of US sample test, we acknowledge the limits to 
generalisability of these results.  
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